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Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act contained two “morality bars” to the registration of 
trademarks: the Disparagement Clause and the Immoral and Scandalous Clause. 
Two recent cases, the Supreme Court decision in Matal v. Tam and the subsequent 
decision from the Federal Circuit, In re Brunetti, both held that the morality bars 
violate the First Amendment. Given the inconsistent application of the Disparage-
ment Clause and the potential for viewpoint discrimination, the Tam Court was cor-
rect in finding it unconstitutional. For similar reasons, the court in Brunetti properly 
extended this holding to the Immoral and Scandalous Clause. However, both deci-
sions ignored the social context in which the marks were used. Considering the cir-
cumstances surrounding the creation of these marks would prevent disparaging 
marks from harming the targeted communities, while also allowing marginalized 
groups to reclaim formerly disparaging terms. If the morality bars were applied us-
ing context-specific analysis, the application could be more consistent, produce bet-
ter results, and could survive First Amendment strict scrutiny. Although both the 
Disparagement Clause and the Immoral and Scandalous Clause have been over-
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I. INTRODUCTION 
For two years, Simon Tam posted advertisements on Craigslist and in local 
classifieds, as well as put up posters in pho noodle houses and Asian shopping cen-
ters, attempting to recruit Asian musicians for a new band.1 Once assembled, Simon 
asked his bandmates, “What’s something you think all Asians have in common?”2 
When they responded with “slanted eyes,” Simon found the name for his band: The 
Slants.3 The name denoted the band’s perspective: their “slant on life, as people of 
color navigating the entertainment industry” while honoring “the Asian-American 
activists who had been using the term in a reappropriated, self-empowering way for 
about 30 years.”4 
In 2010, the band filed to register the name “The Slants” as a federal trade-
mark.5 The trademark was soon rejected as being “disparaging to people of Asian 
descent.”6 Under § 2(a) of the Lanham Act, trademarks cannot be registered if they 
contain “matter which may disparage . . . persons, living or dead . . . .”7 Through a 
long legal battle, the band ended up before the Supreme Court as the new faces of 
a First Amendment movement calling for the revocation of the Lanham Act’s pro-
hibition against disparaging trademarks, known as the Disparagement Clause. The 
law was controversial for years due to the registration of the “Redskins” trademark 
for the professional football team of the same name,8 but it was The Slants who 
finally managed to bring the issue before the Supreme Court in Matal v. Tam.9 
When the Supreme Court heard Simon Tam’s case, it held that the Disparagement 
Clause violated The Slants’ First Amendment right to free speech.10 Exactly six 
years after The Slants first filed for registration, their mark was finally registered.11 
By overturning 70 years of trademark law, the Matal v. Tam ruling sent ripples 
through the trademark world. As a result of the Supreme Court’s holding in Tam, 
the Native Americans fighting the “Redkins” mark were left without legal standing 
and had to drop the case.12 The ruling affected another case in the Federal Circuit, 
In re Brunetti.13 Brunetti concerned the mark “FUCT,”14 which—due to its phonetic 
                                                          
 1. Jessica Chobot, Super Happy Fun Write: The Slants, IGN (Apr. 2, 2008), http://www.ign.com/ar-
ticles/2008/04/02/super-happy-fun-write-the-slants. 
 2. Joe Coscarelli, Why the Slants Took a Fight Over Their Band Name to the Supreme Court, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/19/arts/music/slants-name-supreme-court-
ruling.html. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77/952,263 (filed Mar. 5, 2010) (now abandoned). 
 6. Coscarelli, supra note 2. 
 7. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2006). 
 8. See Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d 439, 450 (E.D. Va. 2015). 
 9. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017). 
 10. Id. at 1765. 
 11. Eugene Volokh, ‘The Slants’ Trademark Registered Today, Six Years After the Application was 
First Filed, WASH. POST (Nov. 14, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspir-
acy/wp/2017/11/14/the-slants-trademark-registered-today-six-years-after-the-application-was-first-
filed/?utm_term=.0cc9c44e9c2b. 
 12. Ian Shapira & Ann E. Marimow, Washington Redskins Win Trademark Fight Over the Team’s 
Name, WASH. POST (June 29, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-
safety/2017/06/29/a26f52f0-5cf6-11e7-9fc6-c7ef4bc58d13_story.html?utm_term=.5e805fced7e6. 
 13. Ben Natter et al., USPTO Navigates New Territory in The Wake of Matal v. Tam, IPWATCHDOG 
(Aug. 17, 2017), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/08/17/uspto-navigates-matal-v-tam/id=86961/. 
 14. In re Brunetti, 2014 WL 3976439, 1 (T.T.A.B. 2014). 
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similarity to the word “fucked”—was also barred under § 2(a) of the Lanham Act.15 
Along with the Disparagement Clause, § 2(a) contains the Immoral and Scandalous 
Clause, which prohibits registration for immoral and scandalous marks.16 The Fed-
eral Circuit, after Matal v. Tam was decided, ordered the parties to submit briefs on 
the applicability of the Tam holding to the Immoral and Scandalous Clause, which 
it considered in handing down its ruling.17 
With so many questions raised by the Matal v. Tam case, the future of trade-
mark law rests in the balance. This article will first examine existing trademark and 
First Amendment law prior to the Matal v. Tam case. This article will then analyze 
the Matal v. Tam ruling and the subsequent ruling in In re Brunetti. This article will 
show that Matal v. Tam was correctly decided, and that In re Brunetti properly ex-
tended the Tam ruling—invalidating the Disparagement Clause—to the Immoral 
and Scandalous Clause. However, this article will also argue the Supreme Court 
failed to address the nuances that complicate the Disparagement Clause, and that 
the Federal Circuit similarly failed to take these nuances into consideration. Finally, 
this article will argue that taking the context of the mark into consideration when 
determining whether a mark should be registered would allow the Disparagement 
Clause to better protect targeted groups from harmful language. Context-specific 
determinations would also allow these same groups to reclaim the harmful terms 
through the use of trademarks. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Trademarks 
A trademark is defined by the Lanham Act as “any word, name, symbol, de-
vice, or any combination thereof” used to distinguish goods and identify the 
source.18 The purpose of providing these marks is to “regulate commerce” and pro-
tect “against unfair competition.”19 A mark used in commerce may be federally reg-
istered.20 It is important to note that an enforceable mark is created through use in 
the marketplace to identify the source of goods, not through federal registration.21 
However, registration can provide several additional benefits to the mark’s owner.22 
The benefits of registration include: serving as constructive notice of ownership in 
the mark;23 serving as prima facie evidence of validity of, ownership of, and the 
right to use the mark;24 and making the mark incontestable after five years.25 
Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act provided that a trademark will be granted reg-
istration unless it “may disparage . . . persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, 
                                                          
 15. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2006). 
 16. Id. 
 17. In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d 1330, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 18. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006). 
 19. Id. 
 20. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a) (2006). 
 21. 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 19:3, at 19–22 (5th ed. 
2017). 
 22. Id. 
 23. 15 U.S.C. § 1072 (2006). 
 24. 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b) (2006). 
 25. 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (2006). 
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or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute . . . .”26 The two-part 
test for deciding if a mark is disparaging under the meaning of the Lanham Act is 
to determine (1) the “likely meaning of the matter in question” and (2) if that mean-
ing involves a protected group, whether it may disparage a “substantial composite 
of the referenced group.”27 
Section 2(a) also bars registration for marks which are “immoral” or “scandal-
ous.”28 To show a mark fits within this category, it must be demonstrated that the 
mark is “shocking to the sense of truth, decency, or propriety; disgraceful; offen-
sive; disreputable; . . . giving offense to the conscience or moral feelings; . . . [or] 
calling out [for] condemnation.”29 A mark may also be deemed immoral or scan-
dalous through demonstration of the mark’s vulgarity.30 Together, the Disparage-
ment Clause and the Immoral and Scandalous Clause form the “morality bars” of 
trademark registration. 
B. First Amendment Speech 
The First Amendment prohibits Congress from “abridging the freedom of 
speech.”31 However, the government is allowed to regulate speech if it can show 
the regulation is “necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is nar-
rowly drawn to achieve that end.”32 
There are several types of speech that are treated differently under the First 
Amendment. The first is government speech. Government speech is kept in check 
primarily through the democratic electoral process.33 It is “a fundamental principle 
of our constitutional system” that “free political discussion” will lead the govern-
ment to “be responsive to the will of the people.”34 Therefore, the government “is 
not barred by the Free Speech Clause from determining the content of what it 
says.”35 
First Amendment jurisprudence also distinguishes speech “proposing a com-
mercial transaction.”36 Commercial speech is given less protection than other forms 
of private speech.37 Therefore, courts apply a lower level of scrutiny. According to 
the Central Hudson test, the government must have a “substantial interest” in re-
stricting commercial speech, and the restrictions must be “narrowly drawn” to 
achieve that interest.38 However, this lower level of scrutiny for commercial speech 
does not apply when the government regulation is “because of disagreement with 
the message it conveys.”39                                                           
 26. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2006). 
 27. In re Squaw Valley Dev. Co., 80 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1264, 1267 (T.T.A.B. 2006). 
 28. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a). 
 29. In re Mavety Media Group Ltd., 33 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (alteration in the original) 
(quoting In re Riverbank Canning Co., 95 F.2d 327, 328 (C.C.P.A. 1938)). 
 30. In re Boulevard Entm’t, Inc., 334 F.3d 1336, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 31. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 32. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). 
 33. Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2245 (2015). 
 34. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931). 
 35. Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2245. 
 36. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 455–56 (1978). 
 37. Id. at 456. 
 38. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 564–65 
(1980). 
 39. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 566 (2011). 
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The First Amendment protects the free speech rights of private citizens when 
the government tries to discriminate based on the content of a message.40 This con-
tent-based discrimination is further split into subject-matter discrimination and 
viewpoint discrimination, which is a more “egregious form of content discrimina-
tion.”41 Violation of a speaker’s First Amendment rights is treated more harshly 
when it targets the particular viewpoints of the speaker rather than the general sub-
ject matter of the message.42 In terms of a public forum, subject-matter discrimina-
tion might be allowed if it “preserves the purposes of that limited forum,” but view-
point discrimination is “presumed impermissible” even when otherwise within the 
bounds of the forum.43 
One exception to the protection of private speech by the First Amendment is 
obscene material.44 While courts agree that obscene, pornographic material is not 
protected, they struggle to establish what exactly constitutes obscenity.45 In Miller 
v. California, the Supreme Court laid out the current test for obscenity as follows: 
(1) whether “an average person, applying contemporary community standards, 
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest”; (2) 
“whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct 
specifically defined by the applicable state law”; and (3) “whether the work, taken 
as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.”46 
When dealing with trademark law, First Amendment free speech is usually not 
the first issue that comes to mind. In recent cases, however, the potential for First 
Amendment violations in the application of trademark law surfaced. These cases—
Matal v. Tam and In re Brunetti—lie at the intersection of trademark law and free 
speech jurisprudence and will have long-lasting effects on how trademarks are 
treated by the law. 
III. CASES AT HAND 
A. Matal v. Tam 
When Simon Tam first tried to register the name of his band, The Slants, as a 
trademark, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) rejected it 
as violating the Disparagement Clause of the Lanham Act. Tam then appealed this 
rejection to the Federal Circuit, where the examining attorney’s refusal to register 
“The Slants” as a trademark was affirmed.47 However, on rehearing en banc, the 
Federal Circuit vacated the holding of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board 
(“TTAB”) that “The Slants” could not be registered due to its disparaging nature, 
and remanded the case back to the TTAB for further proceedings.48 The court made 
                                                          
 40. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995). 
 41. Id. at 829–30. 
 42. Id. at 829. 
 43. Id. at 829–30. 
 44. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973). 
 45. Id. at 22. 
 46. Id. at 24. 
 47. In re Tam, 785 F.3d 567, 573 (Fed. Cir.), vacated, 600 F. App’x 775 (Fed. Cir. 2015), reh’g en 
banc, 808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015), aff’d sub nom. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017). 
 48. In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc), aff’d sub nom. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. 
Ct. 1744 (2017). 
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this holding based on the determination that the Disparagement Clause of the Lan-
ham Act was unconstitutional under the First Amendment.49 The government then 
applied for certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted.50 
The Supreme Court unanimously held that the Disparagement Clause of the 
Lanham Act violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.51 The Court 
first considered Tam’s argument that the Disparagement Clause’s use of the word 
“persons” meant it did not apply to racial or ethnic groups.52 Though the Supreme 
Court did not grant certiorari on this question, it decided to address the issue since 
acceptance of this theory would prevent premature adjudication of a constitutional 
issue.53 The Court found that “a mark that disparages a ‘substantial’ percentage of 
the members of a racial or ethnic group . . . necessarily disparages many ‘persons,’ 
namely, members of that group.”54 In rejecting Tam’s argument, the Court also 
pointed to the lack of legislative history supporting Tam’s interpretation of the 
law.55 
Next, the Supreme Court turned its attention to the government’s arguments. 
The government made three main contentions: (1) trademarks are government, not 
private, speech; (2) trademarks are a form of government subsidy; and (3) a new 
“government-program” test doctrine should be used in testing the Disparagement 
Clause’s constitutionality.56 The Court succinctly rejected the government’s first 
argument, stating that “[t]rademarks are private, not government speech.”57 The 
Court reasoned that trademarks are not used to promote messages for the govern-
ment, nor are they typically associated with the government by the general public, 
so trademarks could not be properly classified as government speech.58 
The government’s second argument was also unpersuasive. The Court distin-
guished trademark registration from government subsidy cases by pointing out there 
is no cash subsidy for trademarks and that trademark registration is more akin to 
other government registration schemes.59 It does not matter that trademark registra-
tion provides many non-monetary benefits at the government’s expense, because 
this is true in most cases of government services.60 Trademarks are not the only 
government registration scheme. The government also registers copyrights, patents, 
driver’s licenses, motor vehicle registrations, hunting licenses, and fishing li-
censes.61 
The government’s third argument cited to two other cases, Davenport v. Wash-
ington Education Ass’n and Ysura v. Pocatello Education Ass’n, as authority point-
ing to a new “government program” doctrine that would extend to registration of 
                                                          
 49. Id. at 1357. 
 50. Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1755. 
 51. Id. at 1751.  
 52. Id. at 1755. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 1756 (citing Trademark Manual § 1203.03(b)(i), at 1200–150). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 1757. 
 57. Id. at 1760. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 1761. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
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trademarks.62 However, the Court characterized the two cases as those that con-
ferred “a substantial non-cash benefit for the purpose of furthering activities that 
they particularly desired to promote but not to provide a similar benefit for the pur-
pose of furthering other activities.”63 Thus, the Court found that Davenport and Ys-
ura were similar to the subsidy cases and, thus, distinguishable from the case at 
hand.64 Cases in which the “government creates a limited public forum for private 
speech” were considered to be more applicable, but, even in such situations, view-
point discrimination “is forbidden.”65 
Another disputed issue was whether trademarks are commercial speech and 
thus subject to relaxed scrutiny under Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Pub-
lic Service Commission of New York.66 The Supreme Court did not reach this ques-
tion, as it determined the Disparagement Clause did not survive even the lower Cen-
tral Hudson level of scrutiny.67 The Central Hudson test is a two-pronged scrutiny 
test for restricting speech: first, the government must assert a “substantial interest,” 
and, second, speech restrictions must be “narrowly drawn.”68 
The first interest the government asserted in its attempt to pass scrutiny was 
that “it has an interest in preventing speech expressing ideas that offend.”69 The 
Court found that this “strikes at the heart of the First Amendment,” and that Amer-
ican free speech jurisprudence protects “the freedom to express ‘the thought that we 
hate.’”70 The government also asserted that it had an interest in “protecting the or-
derly flow of commerce,” arguing that disparaging trademarks would “have an ad-
verse effect on commerce,” much like discriminatory conduct.71 The Supreme 
Court did not contest this interest but moved on to the second prong of the Central 
Hudson test, reasoning that the Disparagement Clause was not “narrowly drawn” 
in order to prevent discriminating trademarks.72 In the Court’s own words, “[i]t is 
not an anti-discrimination clause; it is a happy-talk clause.”73 Thus, the Supreme 
Court found that the Disparagement Clause violated the Free Speech Clause of the 
First Amendment and affirmed the Federal Circuit’s judgment.74 
Justice Kennedy wrote a separate opinion concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan.75 Kennedy em-
phasized the application of viewpoint discrimination protections and argued that, 
under this rationale, no other arguments from the parties required extended attention 
because the viewpoint discrimination aspect was so vital.76 Justice Thomas also 
                                                          
 62. Id. at 1761–62 (citing Davenport v. Washington Educ. Ass’n, 551 U.S. 177 (2007); Ysura v. Poc-
atello Educ. Ass’n, 555 U.S. 353 (2009)). 
 63. Id. at 1762. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 1763. 
 66. Id. at 1763–64. 
 67. Id. at 1764. 
 68. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 564–65 (1980). 
 69. Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1764. 
 70. Id. (quoting United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 655 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 1765. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 76. Id. 
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wrote a short concurrence in which he argued that strict scrutiny should be applied 
regardless of whether trademarks are considered commercial speech.77 
B. In re Brunetti 
While the full impact of the Tam ruling is yet to be seen, courts have already 
begun applying Tam’s reasoning to other parts of the Lanham Act. After Tam was 
decided, its holding was applied to a case in the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals 
called In re Brunetti.78 Erik Brunetti is an entrepreneur known for “revolutionary 
themes, proudly subversive graphics and in-your-face imagery,” and his company, 
“Fuct Manufacturing Co.,” has been selling streetwear since 1991.79 Brunetti sought 
trademark registration for the term “FUCT” for “athletic apparel, namely, shirts, 
pants, jackets, footwear, hats and caps; children’s and infant’s apparel, namely, 
jumpers, overall sleepwear, pajamas, rompers and one-piece garments.”80 The 
trademark examining attorney initially rejected the mark as “vulgar,” and therefore 
not registrable under the Lanham Act, due to its phonetic equivalence to the word 
“fucked.”81 
Brunetti appealed to the TTAB.82 In his appeal, Brunetti claimed that “FUCT” 
was an arbitrary made-up word, unrelated to sexual intercourse.83 To the extent a 
meaning was required, Brunetti claimed the term stood for “friends you can’t 
trust.”84 He further argued that his brand had been used for over 22 years without 
any association with the word “fuck” or with sexual intercourse.85 The TTAB did 
not agree with Brunetti’s assertions that his brand name was completely unassoci-
ated with the word “fuck,” citing both the dictionary definition of “fuck” as well as 
the entry for “fuct” on Urban Dictionary, an online dictionary with user-submitted 
definitions for slang terms.86 Despite the FUCT mark’s long use as an identifier of 
the source of Brunetti’s goods, the TTAB found that the Examining Attorney had 
met his burden that “a substantial composite of the general public” would find the 
term to be vulgar.87 The TTAB therefore affirmed the refusal of registration.88 
The matter was then appealed to the Federal Circuit.89 However, while the case 
was still pending, Matal v. Tam was decided by the Supreme Court. In light of the 
Tam ruling, the parties were both ordered by the court to prepare briefs on how Tam 
would affect the case at hand.90 
The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals began by quickly dismissing Brunetti’s 
argument that his mark FUCT was not vulgar, pointing to its similarity to the word 
“fucked” and its use on products using sexual imagery.91 The court then moved on                                                           
 77. Id. at 1769. 
 78. 877 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 79. In re Brunetti, 2014 WL 3976439, 2 (T.T.A.B. 2014). 
 80. Id. at 1. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 3. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 3, 5. 
 87. Id. at 5. 
 88. Id. at 6. 
 89. Brief at 1, In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (No. 15-1109), 2017 WL 3228588. 
 90. Id. at 2. 
 91. In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d at 1338–39. 
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to the bigger issue: the applicability of the Tam ruling and the constitutionality of 
the Immoral and Scandalous Clause under the First Amendment.92 The government 
conceded that the bar on immoral or scandalous marks was a content-based re-
striction on speech, so the court proceeded using strict scrutiny review.93 However, 
the government also argued that trademark registration was either a government 
subsidy program or a limited public forum, or, alternatively, that it was commercial 
speech, which only warranted the Central Hudson intermediate level of scrutiny.94 
The court considered each of these arguments in turn. 
The government argued that the Immoral and Scandalous Clause is merely a 
reasonable exercise of spending power, “a constitutional condition defining the lim-
its of trademark registration.”95 The court noted that both the Federal Circuit and 
the Supreme Court had rejected this argument when it was made in the Tam case.96 
Trademark registration is unrelated to the spending power of Congress, and, to the 
extent government resources are spent on trademark registration, there is not 
enough to distinguish it from any other service provided by the government which 
requires government funds.97 The court recognized that federal trademark registra-
tion provides many benefits but rejected any analogy between registration and Con-
gress’s grant of federal funds.98 
The government then argued that trademark registration is a limited public fo-
rum. A limited public forum is a government property “limited to use by certain 
groups or dedicated solely to the discussion of certain subjects” where the govern-
ment can constitutionally restrict speech when that restriction is consistent with the 
limited purpose of the forum.99 The court considered several examples of limited 
public forums before finding no similarity between them and trademark registra-
tion.100 It found there was no government property on which the government could 
assert a right to restrict speech and rejected the argument that this requirement was 
met by the list of registered marks on the government’s principal register.101 
The Federal Circuit next addressed the proposition that trademarks are merely 
commercial speech and thus should be met with a lower level of scrutiny under 
Central Hudson. The court acknowledged that trademarks convey a commercial 
message but reasoned they often contain expressive content as well, sometimes es-
pousing a powerful cause or political view.102 The court found that the morality bars 
specifically targeted the expressive parts of a mark and thus were distinguishable 
from other parts of § 2(a) of the Lanham Act, such as the bar on merely descriptive 
marks.103 While the Federal Circuit reasoned this made the Immoral and Scandalous 
Clause subject to strict scrutiny, it also determined that, similar to the Disparage-
ment Clause, the bar would not even meet the Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny 
                                                          
 92. Id. at 1340. 
 93. Id. at 1342. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 1343 (referring to the government subsidy framework developed in Agency for Int’l Dev. v. 
All for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 570 U.S. 205 (2013)). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 1344. 
 98. Id. 
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test, as the government had not asserted a substantial interest to justify the law.104 
The court also pointed out that the inconsistent application of the Immoral and Scan-
dalous Clause created such uncertainty that it could never be considered carefully 
tailored toward any purpose.105 
Lastly, the court considered whether there was a narrower construction of the 
Immoral and Scandalous Clause that might preserve its constitutionality.106 While 
the concurrence suggested limiting its scope to obscene marks, the controlling opin-
ion found this to be unreasonable, as not all scandalous or immoral marks are ob-
scene.107 With no acceptable alternative construction, the Federal Circuit, following 
the Supreme Court’s holding in Matal v. Tam, concluded that the Immoral and 
Scandalous Clause violated the First Amendment, and thus Brunetti could register 
his mark FUCT despite its vulgar nature.108 
After the government lost at the appellate level, the Department of Justice 
urged the Supreme Court to hear the issue and reverse the decision.109 Despite his 
previous victory, Brunetti agreed that the Supreme Court should take up the case to 
clear up any confusion left in the wake of Tam.110 On January 4, 2019, the Supreme 
Court agreed to hear the case.111 
IV. WAS MATAL V. TAM CORRECTLY DECIDED? 
The key issue in both cases was whether it is permissible for the government 
to make moral judgments when affording trademarks the protection of federal reg-
istration. The morality bars—the Disparagement Clause and the Immoral and Scan-
dalous Clause of § 2(a) of the Lanham Act—both seem to pose this question. Due 
to the often subjective nature of moral judgments, it is difficult for the government 
to judge the content of speech without violating the constitutional protections of the 
First Amendment.112 However, evaluations of morality often form the basis of the 
law, and the mere presence of morality judgments does not necessarily preclude 
constitutional justification of the law.113 If the morality bars are to survive strict 
scrutiny, the purposes behind the bars must outweigh the free speech ensured by the 
First Amendment. 
One of the primary purposes of trademark law is to regulate commerce.114 
Commerce is a system that facilitates interactions between peoples of all different 
creeds, views, cultures, and backgrounds.115 Commerce, more than a mere eco-
                                                          
 104. Id. at 1350. 
 105. Id. at 1353–54. 
 106. Id. at 1355. 
 107. Id. at 1355–56. 
 108. Id. at 1357. 
 109. Robert Barnes, Supreme Court to decide if trademark protection can be denied to ‘scandalous’ 
brands, WASH. POST (Jan. 4, 2019, 4:49 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/su-
preme-court-to-decide-if-trademark-protection-can-be-denied-to-scandalous-
brands/2019/01/04/83c18948-1061-11e9-8938-5898adc28fa2_story.html?utm_term=.cbf7b3f8b887. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Id. 
 112. Ned Snow, Moral Judgments in Trademark Law, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 1093, 1104 (2017). 
 113. Id. at 1110. 
 114. Id. at 1094. 
 115. Id. at 1105. 
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nomic benefit, “represents a means for promoting civil dialogue and social agree-
ment across disparate belief systems.”116 Disparaging and immoral marks therefore 
violate this social benefit that commerce provides, as they drive a wedge into the 
peaceful cooperation between diverse peoples.117 The economic benefits an indi-
vidual might reap from a mark might therefore outweigh the offensive interruption 
of the peaceful forum of trade.118 Thus, the Disparagement Clause supports the open 
market by denying government-supported discrimination.119 
While some might argue a discerning free market will render businesses using 
discriminatory trademarks unviable, this is not necessarily the case.120 Consumers 
who agree with the discriminatory mark, as well as those who are indifferent to the 
harm it may cause to the disparaged group, will continue to support the discrimi-
nating business, allowing it to remain in the market.121 This impedes the open mar-
ket by isolating the disparaged group from the rest of consumers. 
However, arguing that the morality bars help to promote commerce is likely to 
be unpersuasive, especially to those—such as the Tam Court—who see the bars as 
a form of viewpoint discrimination.122 Historically, three defenses have been as-
serted when the morality bars have been challenged on First Amendment grounds: 
(1) the bars help prevent harm caused through government endorsement, (2) the 
bars preserve government resources from being spent on disparaging or scandalous 
marks, and (3) the bars do not affect anyone’s ability to use a mark, just their ability 
to register it.123 
The government endorsement argument is related to the government speech 
argument articulated within the Matal v. Tam case. When speech appears to be en-
dorsed by the government, it implies government agreement with the message, and 
has “the effect of conveying a government message,” constituting government 
speech.124 Much like license plates, which were held by the Supreme Court as con-
stituting government speech even if there was also participation by private citizens, 
registered trademarks are also approved by a government board—the USPTO.125 
This might be enough for the public to associate trademark registration with gov-
ernment endorsement, although there is no empirical data on either side of this as-
sertion.126 Even if the government does not endorse a mark outright through regis-
tration, federal registration of a trademark could imply a government opinion that 
it is appropriate for the market and “what the boundaries of appropriate public dis-
course are.”127 
                                                          
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 1106. 
 118. Id. 
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 123. Tushnet, supra note 116, at 389. 
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 127. Id. at 392. 
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The second typical justification, that the disparagement bar saves government 
resources, is easily brushed aside: enforcement of the bar requires significant judi-
cial and administrative resources.128 In contrast, the third justification has a signifi-
cant bearing on the First Amendment implications of the Disparagement Clause: if 
the disparaging mark is refused registration, there is nothing to stop the applicant 
from proceeding to use the mark anyway.129 Though registration for a mark might 
be refused based on its disparaging or moral content, the fact that a citizen is still 
free to use that mark, albeit without government protection, weighs in favor of the 
Disparagement Clause for First Amendment purposes.130  
Arguably, there are reasons to bar disparaging marks that do not rely on eval-
uating the morality of the mark’s content. Marks that are disparaging fail their es-
sential source-identifying function due to their disparaging meaning.131 The emo-
tional impact of a slur or other disparaging mark serves primarily to provoke or 
insult the targeted group, rather than to identify the source.132 In particular, for the 
targeted group, the insulting meaning of the mark overshadows source identifica-
tion.133 This also negatively impacts the disparaging mark’s ability to develop sec-
ondary meaning, as, by definition, a substantial portion of consumers will associate 
it with the disparaging meaning rather than the source.134  
One important consideration of the Tam Court’s overruling of the Disparage-
ment Clause is the implications it has for other parts of the Lanham Act. Other sub-
sections of § 2 bar registration of names,135 merely descriptive terms,136 primarily 
geographically descriptive terms,137 and surnames.138 These bars refuse registration 
to marks that convey truthful information about the products they are used in con-
nection with, yet conveying the truth can constitute a viewpoint for the sake of 
viewpoint discrimination.139 The bar on using the United States flag or other gov-
ernment symbols also raises concerns of viewpoint discrimination, as such displays 
of patriotism certainly constitute expressing a viewpoint.140 Since the Disparage-
ment Clause was overturned largely due to concerns over viewpoint discrimination, 
this same line of logic could be applied elsewhere within the Lanham Act. With the 
Disparagement Clause held unconstitutional, more questions are raised. Are other 
parts of the Lanham Act unconstitutional under the same reasoning? Does trade-
mark registration as a whole trigger First Amendment concerns? 
With Matal v. Tam as binding precedent, lower courts will no longer be able to 
easily reject First Amendment claims in infringement disputes.141 The Tam Court, 
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in determining that the Disparagement Clause attacks an individual’s right to ex-
press themselves, ignores a fundamental right of trademark law. A trademark owner 
has the right “to ask the government to assist the trademark owner in suppressing 
and punishing the expression of third parties who infringe or dilute the mark.”142 
With the law of trademarks designed to suppress certain types of speech to facilitate 
an effective commercial market, it seems odd to invalidate a single clause for work-
ing to achieve the exact purpose the entire field of law is trying to achieve. The Tam 
ruling is admirable in that it allows a racial minority to use trademarks to reclaim a 
disparaging term. However, what about the other side of the issue, namely the mi-
norities who will be forced to deal with disparaging terms in the marketplace? The 
Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse case regarding the Redskins mark was the battle-
ground for this issue years before The Slants brought their case before the Supreme 
Court.143 In that case, a group of Native Americans were trying to get the registra-
tion of the Redskins mark by the professional football team of the same name re-
voked.144 This seems to be the exact type of situation the Disparagement Clause was 
designed to protect against. 
While racial minorities are the subject of the two most important Disparage-
ment Clause cases, they are not the only minority group affected by this law. Trade-
marks can be a valuable building block of identity for other underrepresented 
groups.145 This is especially true for sexual minorities who may not otherwise have 
any physical mark of identification, shared history, or recognized culture to build 
an identity.146 It is incredibly common for sexual minority groups to reclaim previ-
ously hateful slurs as symbols of identity, such as “queer” and “dyke.”147 Refusing 
registration for these reclaimed terms prevents sexual minority groups from using 
them as badges of social identity and, in effect, serves as a government incentive to 
assimilate into heterosexuality.148 
In balancing the interests of minority groups trying to reclaim terms as badges 
of identity and to protect themselves from bigoted terms being used in the market-
place, the identity of the applicant is an important factor to consider.149 The morality 
bars could be implemented much more effectively by giving much higher consid-
eration to the context of the mark in question.150 Creating a more specific standard 
that takes into account contextual factors, such as the identity of the applicant, 
would lead to better results when applying the morality bars as well as draw the 
bars more narrowly in order to help the law survive strict scrutiny.  
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None of the arguments in favor of the Disparagement Clause outweigh the po-
tential for viewpoint discrimination, as found by the Supreme Court. As such, the 
Matal v. Tam case was rightly decided. The Disparagement Clause, as it stands, 
fails its purpose as an anti-discrimination tool. However, with some tweaks to the 
interpretation and application of the law—primarily the consideration of the context 
of the mark—the Disparagement Clause could be much more effective in prevent-
ing discrimination. Additionally, this could help the Disparagement Clause survive 
strict scrutiny. 
V.  WAS THE TAM RULING PROPERLY EXTENDED TO IMMORAL AND 
SCANDALOUS MARKS? 
Four common justifications were asserted in defense of the morality bars: (1) 
the federal government should not give any indication that it favors immoral or 
disparaging marks, (2) it should not waste resources on them, (3) discouraging use 
of immoral or disparaging marks promotes public welfare and morals, and (4) dis-
couraging the immoral and disparaging marks will protect those who might be of-
fended by them.151 However, the cases on these marks have shown that the morality 
bars were applied unpredictably, dependent on factors such as the judge’s own opin-
ions towards the mark and the opinions of “a minority of hypothetically offended 
people.”152 
The highly subjective nature of determining what is “immoral” or “scandalous” 
is one of the major reasons why the morality bars have been so inconsistent.153 For 
example, the mark “Black Tail” for an adult magazine featuring nude African-
American women was rejected by both the USPTO and TTAB based on the alter-
native sexual meanings of the word “tail,” despite the well-recognized registration 
of “Hustler,” a well-known slang term meaning prostitute, for a similar product.154 
When the law creates consistently inconsistent results, it is clear there needs to be a 
change. The ruling in Matal v. Tam was a step in the right direction. However, was 
Tam a step too far, or do more steps need to be taken? If the Disparagement Clause 
constitutes viewpoint discrimination, it quickly follows that other less controversial 
parts of the morality bars to registration qualify as viewpoint discrimination as 
well.155 As evidenced by In re Brunetti, it is clear that the Tam ruling was not going 
to restrain itself solely to the Disparagement Clause. 
The question of overturning a ban on immorality is not new in the world of 
intellectual property. There used to be an immorality ban on patents before it was 
decided that the USPTO “should not be the arbiter of morality.”156 The application 
of the morality bars stays static in a constantly changing world, as judges often 
apply old connotations of words to marks despite changing public opinion on what 
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the word means.157 The logic from Matal v. Tam, if applied to immoral and scan-
dalous marks, seems to apply in the same manner. If a mark’s expressive nature is 
what made it subject to rejection for disparagement, the same is certainly true for 
immoral and scandalous marks.158 
Even though the ban on immoral marks was overturned due to the viewpoint 
discrimination reasoning of the Tam Court, it could potentially come back in a re-
duced form. Obscenity is not a protected form of speech, so a free speech argument 
would not extend to allowing obscene marks into the market.159 However, the Im-
moral and Scandalous Clause was held by the Federal Circuit to cover more than 
just obscene marks, and, if the Supreme Court does not reverse the decision, Con-
gress would have to revise the law in order for it to survive the Brunetti ruling.160 
In addition, the Immoral and Scandalous Clause has even less of a compelling gov-
ernment interest than the Disparagement Clause, as there is no potential anti-dis-
crimination effect in preventing registration for immoral and scandalous marks. 
When taking into consideration the arbitrary and inconsistent applications of the 
Immoral and Scandalous Clause, the potential free speech violations of such a rule, 
and the concept that the USPTO “should not be the arbiter of morality,” it seems 
clear that, from a policy perspective, extending the Tam rule was the best decision. 
Therefore, when the Supreme Court hears the issue later in 2019, it should affirm 
the Federal Circuit’s decision that the Immoral and Scandalous Clause violates the 
First Amendment. 
VI. CONCLUSION  
The Matal v. Tam case rejected the Disparagement Clause and threw the rest 
of § 2 of the Lanham Act into question. Next, In re Brunetti addressed whether the 
Tam ruling should extend to the Immoral and Scandalous Clause. Based on the rea-
soning of the Tam Court, the Immoral and Scandalous Clause was also properly 
rejected. When the Supreme Court hears the issue later in 2019, the proper decision 
would be to affirm the decision to strike down the morality bars, as in their current 
state they are untenable. If proponents of the morality bars of the Lanham Act wish 
to protect them from constitutional challenges, a stricter definition and test must be 
developed in order to survive any level of scrutiny. A narrower test that takes into 
consideration the context of the mark would create more consistent results that are 
better tailored to the purposes behind the morality bars. Barring such a revision, the 
morality bars are best left behind. 
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